CONTENTS

SUMMARY...............................................................................................................................................................3
THE TRADITIONAL MODEL OF DELIVERY..................................................................................................................5
DELIVERY IN THE REAL WORLD..................................................................................................................................5
CHANGING VIEWS OF DELIVERY..............................................................................................................................8
‘PRINCIPALS’ AND ‘AGENTS’...................................................................................................................................8
CURRENT FRAMEWORK FOR DELIVERY AND PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT......................................................10
DEVELOPING THE PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK.................................................................10
HOW MUCH TO CONTROL FROM THE CENTRE......................................................................................................13
CONTESTABILITY AND COMPETITION....................................................................................................................15
WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT WHAT WORKS: LESSONS FROM THE CASE STUDIES..16
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS..........................................................................................................................................20
SPECIFIC OPTIONS ..................................................................................................................................................21
  Annex 1: Case study summaries..............................................................................................................................23
  Annex 2: Questions to ask any of any major delivery project..............................................................................39
  Annex 3: Selected references.................................................................................................................................40
  Annex 4: Seminar participants...............................................................................................................................41

Contact for this discussion paper:

Andrea Lee
Performance and Innovation Unit
Admiralty Arch
The Mall
London SW1A 2WH
Tel: 020 7276 1457
alee@cabinet-office.x.gsi.gov.uk
SUMMARY

This discussion paper was prepared as background material for a PIU seminar in January 2001 (a list of attendees is contained in Annex 4), and has been revised in the light of comments.

Its objective is to encourage more rigorous thinking about delivery issues within Government and to focus attention on what can be done, particularly at the centre, to help those on the frontline achieve better results. The paper does not represent government policy or a government viewpoint.

The paper draws on a series of brief case studies examining recent experiences of policy delivery (included as Annex 1). These cover:

- The Literacy Hour
- Youth Justice Reforms
- Breast Cancer Screening
- New Deal for Young People
- Streetworks

These have been chosen to cover a spectrum from highly directive, top-down policies to ones involving significantly greater discretion.

The paper sets these case studies within the context of changing approaches to delivery and performance management. It shows that effective delivery in practice depends on many things:

- a few clear and consistent priorities
- a widely shared and understood vision
- policy design that has taken account of implementation issues and knowledge of what works
- often intensive support and training for managers and front-line staff
- sufficient freedom for those on the ground to innovate and adapt policy to local conditions
- clear leadership
- effective management of complex technologies
- clear lines of accountability
- quick learning

Success depends on getting all of these right. Failure in one area can undermine the whole process. The elements of delivery are better understood as multiplicative rather than additive.
Some of the most high profile delivery failures share common features: poor management of IT; lack of ‘reality checks’; unrealistic timescales; poor communication and HR strategies.

Past experience shows that delivery is rarely a one-off task. It is best understood not as a linear process – leading from policy ideas through implementation to change on the ground – but rather as a more circular process involving continuous learning, adaptation and improvement, with policy changing in response to implementation as well as vice versa.

The paper shows that delivery of public services always depends on the actions of people and institutions that cannot be directly controlled by central government, departments and agencies. Although short-term results can be achieved through direction, in the long run it is more efficient and effective to motivate and empower than to issue detailed commands. In several policy areas government is therefore seeking to define a new balance in which:

- fewer, but clearer, outcome targets are combined with …
- greater freedom for managers to adapt and innovate, alongside …
- clearer expectations that poor performance will be tackled decisively

The paper concludes with a series of general and more specific options for achieving a more delivery-focused approach in central government, in particular in the ‘centre’ – No 10, Cabinet Office and Treasury.
BETTER POLICY DELIVERY AND DESIGN

1. All governments are judged by how well they deliver results – whether they leave children better educated, trains more punctual, the population healthier. The capacity to deliver is part of the implicit contract between the state and its citizens.

2. Many policies are successfully implemented. But too often over the last few decades, policies that appear impressive on paper have been poorly implemented. There are good reasons for believing that in the recent past delivery and implementation have been given insufficient attention or status.

The traditional model of delivery

3. Delivery by central government has traditionally been understood as a relatively simple linear process:

   • Politicians identify a priority and the broad outlines of a solution (eg in the form of a manifesto commitment)
   • Policy-makers in Whitehall design a policy to put this into effect, assembling the right collection of tools: legislation, funding, incentives, new institutions and directives
   • The job of implementation is then handed over to a different group of staff, an agency or local government
   • … the goal is (hopefully) achieved

4. The implication of this model is that implementation and delivery are more likely to succeed if there is:

   • a tight process with few intermediaries
   • simple lines of accountability
   • clear prescription to minimise the scope for fudge
   • tough penalties and rewards on each link in the chain to perform their task

5. If these conditions are in place, with the right people in the right jobs, and adequate funding, success should be assured.

Delivery in the real world

6. In some fields, and at some times, this model works. But in important respects it doesn’t accurately describe the real world that governments
operate in, and its application often leads to failure and frustration. Why is this?

7. First, because **delivery involves at least three closely related, but different, elements:**

- **Implementation** of policy – for example the introduction of a cancer screening service or a literacy programme
- **Achievement of targets** – for example an objective for waiting lists or exam results
- **Achievement of better outcomes** – for example lower mortality or better employability

8. In many cases these three reinforce each other, as successive stages in a single process. But sometimes they can be in tension. Effective implementation of a flawed policy can worsen outcomes (for example the initial introduction of the National Curriculum), as can too great an emphasis on the wrong targets (for example some of the early policing performance indicators). Too many new policies and initiatives can wreck delivery by diverting management time – carrying out instructions gets in the way of better outcomes. Successful delivery therefore depends on a rounded understanding of the links between implementation, targets and outcomes.

9. Second, because **central government has only limited control over many of the people and institutions responsible for delivery.** Even in executive agencies – such as the Prisons Service or Benefits Agency - which are directly accountable to central government, professional groups and staff organisations can play a critical role in helping or hindering delivery. The NHS is in some respects a vertically integrated organisation, but in other respects power is widely distributed to health authorities, professionals, nurses, regulators and others. In many key areas of policy, governments wanting to improve results for the citizen depend on the behaviour of third parties - local authorities, police, judiciary, voluntary sector or private contractors – which may not respond in straightforward ways to legislative commands or financial incentives. Excessively directive methods of government that appear to treat front-line deliverers as unable to think for themselves, untrustworthy or incompetent, undermine the very motivation and adaptability on which real-world success depends.
10. Third, because **few policies are implemented fully formed**. The traditional model assumes that policy-makers have complete knowledge about what will work. The ideal of policy fully informed by an evidence-base is rarely attainable; most research gives pointers rather than definitive answers, and in the real world it is not easy to predict how institutions and people will respond. As a result in practice ideas are tested either in pilots – with no guarantee that the results can be applied nationally – or prototypes and pathfinders where policies have to be rapidly adapted in the light of early experience. The more quickly policies are adapted in the light of experience, drawing lessons from the frontline, the more chance they have of succeeding.

11. Fourth, because decision-makers at the top of hierarchies inevitably know less about the operating environment than those at the front line. This is why in many fields (such as the military or business), leaders prefer to use what are sometimes called **‘loose-tight’ frameworks**: a combination of clear objectives and freedom for those with local knowledge to adapt to circumstances: very different to the model of ‘delivering’ a centrally defined solution.

12. Fifth, because **successful delivery depends on systems**: how institutions; funding; regulation; human resources and motivation; and, increasingly, technologies and IT systems, develop and interact. Unless account is taken of each of these elements in the policy design phase, there is a high risk of delivery problems.

13. Sixth, because many of the top priorities of modern governments (particularly in crime, education, health, the environment and welfare) depend on **changing behaviour and cultures** as well as improving services: for example changing motivations to learn; attitudes to health and diet; attitudes to welfare and work. The models of mass consumer delivery drawn from the private sector in the 1980s and 1990s have only limited relevance in these cases.

14. Seventh, because of **interdependencies between policies**. Single policies, however well implemented, are unlikely to have much effect on the biggest challenges to government – such as improving competitiveness or tackling social exclusion. Instead it is the combination of policies that is likely to be decisive.
Changing views of delivery

15. Concern about delivery is not new. It has dominated successive waves of thinking about policy making over the 40 years, each of which has arisen as a response to perceived failures of delivery. These can be described schematically as follows:

- **1940s-70s**: concern about the inefficiency, inequity and variability of private companies (eg in energy), and charities (eg in health) leads to a big expansion of the public sector; delivery is achieved through nationally integrated services, corporations, professions and plans, leaving a substantial amount of autonomy for professionals (eg teachers or planners).

- **1980s**: loss of confidence in the capacity of government to deliver, and the priority given to cutting public spending, leads to the replacement of the state by private companies, and encouragement of more competitive markets; empowerment of consumers and competition is seen as the key to successful services; cash limits provide sharper incentives for public agencies; independent regulators are introduced to sharpen performance and accountability.

- **1990s**: concern about the limited scope for full privatisation in key sectors leads to the introduction of quasi-markets within government; a strong emphasis on incentives; a stronger customer focus, including ‘one-stop shops’; charters to embody consumer rights; separation of policy and implementation through Next Steps executive agencies to ensure more business-like delivery; the growth of performance indicators; PFI to bring in new capital and expertise; and market testing across the public sector.

- **2000s**: A stronger political commitment to outcomes in education, health, crime and employment leads to the advent of PSAs - fewer targets but focused on outcomes; joined-up government to tackle the holistic nature of delivery; recognition of problems in the agency/policy split (now under review); application of the principle of intervening in inverse proportion to success; creation of on-line services (NHS Direct, UfI, NGfL etc.) in parallel with traditional services.

‘Principals’ and ‘agents’

16. A central issue through each of these periods has been how to ensure that the actions of thousands of organisations, and millions of individuals, are better aligned with the priorities set by central government.
17. Contemporary understanding of this issue has been profoundly shaped by the idea – articulated most clearly by ‘public choice’ theorists in the 1960s and 1970s – that there is an inherent conflict of interest between the ‘principal’, central government, which wishes to achieve the maximum outputs at minimum cost, and the ‘agents’, the agencies, professionals and others, who have different goals and cultures and who will tend to protect their own interests and maximise their funding.

18. Policy-makers are still working through the implications of this analysis which has already encouraged improvements in public services through much more precise measurement of performance (to enable the principal to judge the agent); purchaser-provider splits; the successful application of the executive agency model in many fields; and the growing use of quasi-markets.

19. However, some of its limits have also become apparent. In some of the earlier – and cruder – responses to this analysis it was assumed that the centre could improve delivery by awarding more resources (including performance related pay) to the good performers and less to the poor performers.

20. Some rewards for performance can be a powerful tool. However, there is a serious risk of dysfunctional results: where service areas are high priorities it is not possible (or just) to penalise them financially; driving through policies with an implicit assumption that the main players are the problem, rather than part of the solution, is usually a recipe for failure; and personal rewards systems that appear to be capricious (because of the impact of external factors on targets) can demotivate rather than motivate, as the mixed experience of performance related pay in the private sector shows.

21. The principal-agent model can also encourage an artificial divide between policy and implementation. Some of the reforms introduced in the 1980s and early 1990s (including the establishment of Executive Agencies) arguably reinforced this divide – and prevented the kind of continuous improvement and learning that has characterised the best policy successes of recent years.

22. The divide between policy and implementation can also encourage a blame culture in which ministers and policy makers too easily blame implementers when things go wrong. The management thinker Henry Mintzberg once famously pointed out how wrong it is for those at the top of organisations to allocate blame in this way. There is, he argued, no such thing as an implementation gap in strategy and policy: only policies
and strategies that are poorly designed, and that fail to take account of the realities of implementation.

**The current framework for delivery and performance management**

23. As a result of these lessons a more sophisticated approach to performance management is taking shape, both within the centre (No10, Cabinet Office and Treasury) and in departments.

24. At its core is a system for measuring and managing performance which now includes:

- PSAs and SDAs (and the array of agency targets) setting clear expectations for performance which can be cascaded down to front-line staff, and providing clear signals about relative priorities.

- a machinery for monitoring implementation – including PSX and Prime Ministerial stocktakess – to enable quick adjustment of priorities, resources and targets

- regular spending and policy reviews – to enable medium term adjustments to strategies and targets

- a clutch of parallel moves around cross-cutting issues, the use of knowledge, and the involvement of outsiders and practitioners

- greater investment in evaluation to analyse policy successes and failures

**Developing the performance management framework**

25. This framework provides a powerful set of tools for rigorous performance management. It has contributed to substantial improvements in performance in key public services.

26. However it needs to be further elaborated and developed if a culture focused on delivery is to take root. This section sets out some of the priorities.

27. For the reasons set out above the first contribution to better performance is **clarity about objectives**, and the willingness to **focus resources (financial, human, ministerial and legislative)** on these priorities. This is essentially a political task. Too many initiatives; too many targets; too many programmes; too little consistency; too little clarity about priorities: these are the worst enemies of successful delivery.
28. Having established clear goals and priorities the next task is to **design policies in the light of a full understanding of the practicalities of delivery**. Policies need to be rigorously assessed for their realism, designed with a capacity for continuous improvement, and understood by everyone with a role to approach to policy design and the use by policy-makers of more rigorous, play in putting it into practice. This requires an approach to policy that is both more inclusive, involving practitioners from the start, and more informed by formal analysis of the processes involved in implementation.

29. The same considerations apply to **the definition of targets**. Good targets are realistic and meaningful and reflect the desired policy outcomes; are stretching but achievable; and can be cascaded down to the front line. Several decades of experience with the use of targets around the world makes it possible to draw some very clear conclusions about their positive effects, and their limitations.

30. Once policies are being implemented there needs to be **effective measurement of performance** in as close to real time as possible, and in as widely accessible a form as possible. Despite the progress achieved by the Audit Commission and others, accurate measurement remains underdeveloped in many fields, and there is great potential for designing systems that more automatically generate comprehensible performance information for decision-makers and users (much internal management information concerning performance in public institutions should increasingly be in the public domain). Compared to most large organisations central government is still relatively short on useable and timely performance information, and the analysis and interpretation that is needed to make sense of it.

31. The key caveat is that there is always a risk of diverting scarce resources, time and experience away from direct delivery and into inspection and measurement. The UK already has a higher ratio of measurers and inspectors of performance to those engaged in direct delivery than most other countries. There is no strong comparative evidence that this gives the UK an edge in terms of performance.

32. This matters because some of the current **structures and cultures of audit militate against effective delivery**: they are too focused on processes and rules rather than outcomes; too focused on micro issues rather than strategy; and strongly skewed against entrepreneurship.

33. In addition there is considerable evidence that **the regulatory burden** on some public service managers and front-line staff has grown
unacceptably heavy. The Regulatory Impact Unit work on schools, police and GPs is already encouraging departments to think more seriously about the cumulative burden which results from inspection regimes and reporting requirements.

34. Once performance information has been gathered and analysed departments and the centre of government need to be able to make valid judgements about what is happening to performance: why it is succeeding or failing, and what needs to be done to improve it. In principle, there are many very different reasons why a target may be missed. These include:

- Poor central management
- Poor local management causing wide variations in performance
- Poor policy design
- Poor design of the target in the first place
- An unexpected change in the external environment
- Public opposition
- Inadequate funding
- Inadequate support
- Inadequate incentives or penalties for delivery
- Inadequate HR or IT strategies to support the policy
- Lack of buy-in to the vision by the main players
- Overambitious timescales
- Overload
- Political imperatives overriding reality checks

35. Making judgements of this kind depends on high calibre, experienced capacity at the centre, with a strong sense of ‘on the ground reality’, preferably achieved through frontline career experience, secondments etc; access to multiple sources of information and assessment (including user feedback, feedback from inspectorates, task forces etc.); as well as the use of external consultancy.

36. Depending on how failure to meet a target is assessed, the next step is to determine an appropriate response. The available responses would include:

- rethinking the policy
- redefining the target
- changing top management and leaders (including ministers and permanent secretaries)
- changing local management (from district managers to head teachers)
- investing more in delivery capacity
• increasing funding (or changing it in some other way)
• reshaping HR or IT strategies (including rethinking PPPs)
• reshaping ownership and/or control

37. Much of this may appear obvious. But rigorous assessment of the options for improving performance is rare, and there are substantial cultural, political and institutional barriers standing in the way.

38. Within any organisation the management of new business and old business involves very different challenges. Recent public sector experience shows, for example, the importance of taking the development of new business off-line, at least initially. But many of the performance management issues set out above apply equally to both.

**How much to control from the centre**

39. Alongside a performance management system of this kind, government also needs to strike the right balance between **centralisation and decentralisation**. It is a conventional wisdom that the most effective organisations manage through objectives, not through detailed prescription. Whitehall departments are often criticised for excessively detailed guidance or instructions, insufficiently informed by real life experience. Central control is too often used as a default option, particularly in response to crises.

40. There is no simple answer to the question of what should be centralised, and what should be devolved.

41. So long as central government remains the primary source of funding for services, and so long as national politicians remain accountable for results, it is inevitable that the centre will retain overall responsibility for outcomes, and will legitimately want to set targets. Moreover with greater transparency of local performance information, the public is likely to want more rather than less harmonisation of performance standards and outcomes achieved. The potential for e-delivery of services also brings into play substantial economies of scale and scope that could be lost as a result of too much fragmentation.

42. However, the fact that central government is accountable for results does not imply that it should specify *how* results are to be achieved. Too much central specification will tend to lead to demotivation, a failure to tailor services to local needs, and excess red tape.

43. There are some cases where such prescription is justified: where there is clear evidence that one procedure works best – as in the case of the
Literacy Hour, or the recommendations of NICE based on medical trials – then it may be legitimate to prescribe in detail. In other cases however, where there isn’t a sufficient knowledge base, central prescription can lead to worse, rather than better results.

44. The centre may also need to play a directive role when a service is seriously underperforming – for example to ensure that there is a change of culture or of personnel. There may be cases – as in schools and the Literacy Hour – where it is necessary to drive through changes in behaviour which in turn shift attitudes once front-line staff come to understand the advantages of change. However, these periods of central direction should be relatively short – unless power and discretion are quickly passed back to front-line staff there is a risk of disempowerment and dependency.

Accountability

45. The balance between central control and devolution is closely tied up with issues of accountability. Greater decentralisation and risk-taking are bound to lead to more failures as well as successes. So long as ministers are held accountable, or believe themselves to be held accountable, for problems of day to day operations it will be difficult to give front line managers autonomy.

46. It has long been argued that it would be more meaningful for public accountability to rest more clearly with those genuinely responsible for delivery – agency Chief Executives, managers of operating units, head teachers, Chief Constables and so on – rather than ministers. In principle ministers should primarily be held to account for the overall strategy they set, and the overall results achieved. In some cases this has proven difficult, partly because of public and media expectations. However such cases are rare, and as a rule in the past ministerial accountability may have too often been used as a justification for over-centralisation.

47. This raises a more general, but critical, issue of promoting, strengthening and supporting leadership across the public sector. Leaders at different levels, not just those at the very top, need to have some accountability for performance but at the same time freedom to direct and lead. The PIU’s research report, “Strengthening Leadership in the Public Sector”, sets out a framework for taking forward the leadership debate.
Compacts and contracts

48. As the previous discussion makes clear it is often misleading to think of a straightforward trade-off between centralisation and decentralisation. Often the best solutions combine elements of centralisation (for example over standards and performance measurements) with decentralisation (over methods used) or centralisation for brief periods when a system is changing direction followed by greater devolution.

49. Governments have at their disposal many tools for balancing central specification and local discretion in order to achieve effective delivery. Sweden has a long history of devolving power within the context of national frameworks, and has been a pioneer in terms of achieving a clearer focus on outcomes. The Netherlands and France have both used contracts of various kinds to commit national and local agencies to shared sets of targets towards which each contributes. The new local PSAs are beginning to take England in a similar direction.

Contestability and competition

50. Competition is another powerful tool for improving performance. In the private sector as much as a half of all productivity gains come from market entrants, as opposed to incremental improvements from existing companies. Within the public sector there has been some experience with various forms of competition – notably in schools, health and through the impact of CCT and more recently Best Value. In other countries competition and competitive entry within public services are common: for example in Denmark or the Netherlands the scope for newcomers to establish schools eligible for public funding acts as a spur on the public sector system.

51. These experiences have shown that competition can have beneficial effects on performance, but that these gains can be outweighed by additional transactions costs. In some cases there have also been unwanted distributional effects.

52. As a result there has been growing interest in the use of ‘contestability’, a concept first developed in relation to utilities. Policies for contestability aim to ensure that it is possible for new entrants to enter the field. According to the theory, the possibility of newcomers entering the market encourages existing providers to improve performance and innovate. With the right design, contestability arrangements can achieve many of the benefits of competition without the substantial costs associated with quasi-markets. The policy on failing schools; failing LEAs; and the use of the private sector in the New Deal and ONE – are...
good recent examples of how the threat of competitive entry can serve as a spur to performance in the public sector.

53. In practice, contestability doesn’t work in all circumstances: in particular there needs to be sufficient private sector (or voluntary sector) capacity to provide a credible alternative; and there needs to be accurate performance information to underpin judgements about success and failure.

54. Competition can also come from new channels. Some of the new services being offered on-line – National Grid for Learning, NHS Direct, UfI – may have similar effects to contestability models, since they both complement and compete with existing models of provision.

What do we know about what works: lessons from the case studies

55. Given how much experience there is of delivering policy, it is surprising how little systematic knowledge there is about what works (although the literature has no shortage of applicable models).

56. One reason is that more ideologically driven governments were not eager to rigorously assess delivery lessons. Another is that governments have only relatively recently invested substantial resources in evaluation, and even when there are serious evaluations the range of factors that can impact on results makes it hard to draw definitive conclusions.

57. The result is that our current knowledge base is piecemeal, and the UK’s capacity for applied research remains weak, although work is underway to address these gaps.

58. For the purposes of this paper, five brief case studies have been assembled to illustrate the varied experience of delivery in practice. These, together with other examples, provide valuable lessons in understanding what works and what doesn’t. A greater knowledge base – both from the UK and from other countries that have subjected policies to rigorous scrutiny and evaluation - will enable us to draw out more general conclusions in future.

59. This section attempts to summarise the key lessons from these case studies (see Annex 1 for a summary of each case study).

Top-down works…but only under limited conditions

60. In the classic top-down models successful delivery depends on a single organisation in charge with clear authority; clear objectives; good
communication within and between organisations; manageable time pressures; a strong knowledge base about what works.

61. These conditions rarely exist in practice. But some policies have come close.

62. The Literacy Hour has been a classic example of top-down policy implementation. There was clear evidence on how to deliver improvements in reading ability. Government implemented a highly prescriptive model, pushed the policy through despite initial opposition, invested high level political support, provided substantial resources to those implementing the policy and in time achieved widespread support from key stakeholders. This made it possible to compensate for the difficulties involved in achieving cooperation between several different tiers of government – including schools and LEAs. Two crucial elements of success have been identified: firstly, the alignment of policy components against specified high profile goals and secondly, on-going professional development of high quality at every level. The programme is on track to meet its target by 2002.

63. Incremental improvements to existing programmes can also follow this model: the extension of breast cancer screening is a good example. The target is clear; the product uniform across the country, and a command and control structure has been put in place operating through a single line of authority.

64. In both of these cases there was strong research evidence to back up the case for change. The establishment of institutions like NICE and the evidence based research centres in education supported by DfEE should allow more evidence based prescription in the future.

65. A more complex example of top-down, prescriptive success was the sale of council houses to occupiers, since this had to be implemented by local authorities, many of which were actively hostile to the policy. The ‘right-to-buy’ succeeded because the outcome was easily specified and non-implementers could be easily identified; because central government was willing to invest substantial political and financial capital in achieving results; and because tenants had a strong incentive to support change. But the lower quality of remaining stock was an unintended consequence.

66. Less successful examples of central prescription include: the first national curriculum (which involved very high costs in subsequently making it workable) and the introduction of the Community
**Charge/Poll Tax.** In each case there was little formal knowledge base to draw on, or a reluctance to draw on available research, as well as failure to buy in key stakeholders.

**Bottom Up…**

67. At the other end of the spectrum are policies that are genuinely bottom up. The best examples are the regeneration initiatives – the SRB and more recently the New Deal for Communities – which have involved local communities intensively in the design of policy. The SRB has been extensively evaluated, with broadly positive conclusions (though it is inherently more difficult to evaluate and compare programmes in which both the means and ends have been locally determined).

68. Many of the key lessons from these programmes are similar to the other ones highlighted in this discussion paper, and have been set out in recent Social Exclusion Unit reports: the importance of clarity about priorities; long-termism and consistency; building up local capacity and community engagement; support for skills; attention to interdependencies (particularly economic ones); and the critical importance of high quality public services.

**Top-Down…with discretion**

69. There are a number of examples where top-down implementation has balanced central prescription with some local discretion. The New Deal for Young People combined a tightly specified central design with some room for flexibility at local level, particularly for units of delivery led by the private sector.

70. The policy drew on a good deal of research evidence from Scandinavia, Australia and north America, although none of it had the robustness of the evidence on the literacy hour (and much of the research evidence confirmed that how policies are implemented is as important as their formal design).

71. The implementation challenge of the New Deal was to strike the right balance between discretion and prescription, given wide variations between different labour markets, the types of clients involved and the mix of problems they faced. Some of the districts making the most of this discretion have achieved the best performance although it is not possible to separate this factor clearly from the impact of other local labour markets on performance. One solution, as in schools, is maybe to give steadily increasing autonomy to managers who have proven their capacity to perform.
72. The other good example of a half way house is the **Youth Justice reform strategy** which involved some central prescription (and a high profile national target of halving the time taken to process young offenders) but also depended critically on the establishment of local partnerships and Youth Offender Teams to take responsibility for shaping delivery to local circumstances, with the buy-in of local authority chief executives as key goal.

73. The Youth Justice example shows the value of developing policy outside the existing agency structures. This permitted a more radical and imaginative approach. The Youth Justice Board also appreciated the value of developing working models that others in the field could observe.

74. The experience of **Executive Agencies** can be understood as an attempt to achieve a better balance between central policy-setting and effective, and more flexible, delivery. As a broad generalisation, those agencies that are responsible for clearly defined, and relatively uncontroversial, arms length tasks have tended to be most successful. In some cases the logical next step has been privatisation or full contracting out of the task. Those operating in areas where policy and its implementation are more inextricably entwined (such as the Benefits Agency or the Prisons Service) have run into more problems.

**Learning from failure…**

75. A key lesson from recent experience is the importance of **faster horizontal learning** between front-line operating units. Learning is certainly helped by the presence of the Internet, and by more traditional tools such as conferences and discussion groups. But it appears to work best where there is some formal structure and support for learning networks. There is now a wide range of examples: ‘Talking Heads’ linking headteachers; the Surestart network; the GP and Cancer Collaboratives in health; the New Deal for Communities network in regeneration.
General conclusions

76. Several general conclusions follow from this analysis.

- Where there is a strong knowledge base, and broad consensus, a high degree of central specification can work, so long as it focuses on a few key priorities.

- Where there is less knowledge about what works, management by objectives is more likely to succeed, leaving more freedom for front-line managers and staff.

- In all fields there will be benefits from involving practitioners in policy-making, and ensuring that their informal knowledge is used early in the policy process.

- Policy-makers and ministers should be ruthlessly economical with goals: one or two primary ones for any initiative. The temptation to multiply objectives should be resisted.

- Policy-makers should be economical with initiatives: monitor the regulatory/policy burden on those involved in delivery; and close down old initiatives alongside the introduction of new ones.

- Every new initiative needs a built-in capacity to learn from monitoring and evaluation. This may involve horizontal networks to allow sharing of best practice; ‘lessons learned’ units in departments to quickly identify emerging solutions and issues and to study the ‘positive deviants’; rapid feedback to policy-makers. Unexpected results should not always be seen as a problem – they can be one of the best sources of innovation.

- The centre needs quick and accurate information about performance and the capacity to make rounded judgements about good or bad performance, and about the appropriate responses.

- In the past IT problems have repeatedly undermined delivery. With the advent of the e-envoy, and the Office of Government Commerce, these issues should be better managed in the future. A similar reappraisal of how HR issues are managed may now be overdue, since HR problems – ranging from recruitment and retention to skills and motivation – threaten to be the biggest impediment to successful delivery in the next 5-10 years.
• Task forces – which involve practitioners and stakeholders – may play as valuable role in overseeing delivery as they have in policy development, providing a useful alternative source of ideas, information and feedback.

Specific options

77. Additionally, there are a number of specific options to consider arising out of the previous discussion:

• The development of a more systematic, and transparent, way of analysing successes and failures. This could be done through the PSX framework. The checklist of questions – Annex 2 – could provide a basis for this.

• A more reliable and widely accessible information base. One option would be a publicly accessible database of PSAs and SDAs.

• More attention to delivery earlier in the policy-making process. One option would be to develop a challenge function in the centre of government through the creation of a ‘Challenge Team’, largely made up of people with proven experience of delivery, to test and probe departmental plans and report to the Prime Minister on deliverability and potential risks. At present the main challenge functions focus either on money inputs, or are retrospective audit. A more formal challenge team, focusing on a relatively small number of major initiatives, might encourage departments to raise their game without undermining departments’ ownership of the policy.

• A stronger coaching and support structure to offer help and advice on implementation and delivery, time-scales and new policy tools. This should primarily exist within departments and agencies. But there would be value in a core of expertise at the centre with the capacity to draw on a network of more specialist skills outside government if required, building on the work of the CMPS. Some individual programmes have built up networks of this kind, as well as encouraging more communication and sharing of best practice between delivery units.

• Consideration could be given to developing the Spending Review framework to include more formal assessment of how well departments are managing policy design and implementation issues.

• To support policy makers there is a case for developing a much more systematically organised knowledge pool collecting evidence on implementation and delivery, and making it available publicly as a key output of spending reviews. ‘Lessons learned’ exercises carried out after...
major implementations, and made available throughout government, would ensure that mistakes were less likely to be repeated (the US army provides a useful model of how this can be done).

• **Web-based tools for linking policy and delivery.** An important message of many of the case studies is the need for better communication between all levels of the system - those involved in policy, development and implementation - and the need for better links between potential implementers and policy makers. This is an area in which technology has an important role to play. Within business new softwares are being developed which make it possible for a far wider range of participants to take part in policy development projects and change processes. These change tools use the web to link together the many players likely to involved in a change process: top managers, a core project team, other interested bodies, practitioners and stakeholder organisations, all with different levels of access defined through passwords. The models under development, all of which are web-enabled, potentially allow the whole delivery community to participate in the process from policy design through implementation to review and improvement, including:
  - discussion groups with practitioners to review emerging policy ideas;
  - provision of advice to managers when they hit problems, including vignettes setting out parallel experiences and how they were dealt with;
  - transparent performance data; discussion groups for implementers to share practice. Perhaps their most important value is to allow all of those involved in delivering change to develop a shared diagnosis of the problem, a common vision of the solutions and a common language for describing what needs to be done. Development of applications of this kind of tool in central government should be a priority and could grow out of the work of the Knowledge Network.
Annex 1: Case study summaries

1. The Literacy Hour

2. Youth Justice Reforms

3. Breast Cancer Screening

4. New Deal for Young People

5. Streetworks
THE LITERACY HOUR: TOP DOWN

The ‘literacy hour’ was introduced in primary schools in September 1998 as part of the National Literacy Strategy. The Literacy hour has four elements:

- whole class working on a shared text;
- whole class word or sentence level work;
- guided reading and writing in small groups or individually;
- a plenary session to reinforce what has been learnt.

The target is that by 2002, 80% of all 11-year olds will achieve level 4 (the expected standard for their age). Achievement in 1996 was 57%.

1. A literacy taskforce, chaired by Professor Michael Barber with headteachers, school governors, OFSTED representatives and academics, began to develop strategy prior to election. The taskforce looked at best practice in the UK and abroad, comparative evidence on standards and economic performance in other countries and the existing pilots being conducted in 20 LEAs.

The strategy was carefully planned before implementation, although once implementation began it was done with urgency.

Pilots were underway which informed development of the national strategy.

2. The taskforce reported in February 1997 and set out the fundamental elements of the strategy.


DfEE set clear target and Secretary of State added personal commitment to it.

The national target was set by DfEE to be “challenging but realistic”. Based on latest available results in 1996.

Timetable clear plus knowledge that resources would be available. High quality support materials and training succeeded in getting early buy-in from education sector.
4. Period from summer 1997- September 1998 to put infrastructure in place and get teachers trained. Two key elements:

   (i) 300 ‘literacy consultants’ to deliver training. 50% funded by DfEE/50% by LEA. The teaching framework and accompanying training materials were drawn up by DfEE in consultation with partners and practitioners. It set out detailed teaching objectives for each term of primary school teaching. LEAs ran 1-day training conferences for head/lead teachers/governors prior to in-school training programme for every primary school teacher.

   Training delivered early and timely.

   DfEE prepared ‘prescriptive’ teaching material, potentially controversial but widely accepted because of its high quality.

   ‘External’ factors/context helped: new Government, teachers welcomed guidance, willingness to try changes, primary school teachers probably more receptive to prescriptive methods.

   The fact that teachers felt part of a national strategy also had positive impact on willingness to accept changes.

   (ii) A reporting structure comprising National Director and 10 regional directors employed by DfEE. The RDs are responsible for delivery through the training consultants. The National Director reports to DfEE.

5. OFSTED remain responsible for inspection of school standards and teaching within schools. This encompasses teaching through the Literacy Hour programme. They are also conducting a specific evaluation of the literacy strategy and providing regular feedback, which has led to refinements of the strategy.

   The role of OFSTED completes the three key elements of: target setting, inspection and support (resources and training).

6. The Literacy Hour was rolled out in September 1998. Pupils then starting year 3 will be the cohort required to reach the national target set for 2002. Those pupils in higher years who will not benefit for the full duration of the strategy have received additional literacy teaching.
7. The annual national results and OFSTED’s evaluation reports show that the Literacy Hour is raising standards, and that the Government is on track to achieve its 2002 target. The biggest impact so far has been on standards of reading, and more is now being done to close the gap between reading and writing.

Source: material from DfEE
REFORM OF THE YOUTH JUSTICE SYSTEM: HALFWAY HOUSE

The youth justice system comprises the work of the police, courts, Crown Prosecution Service, youth offending teams (formed by police, social services, education, health and probation authorities) local authority secure units, secure training centres and young offenders institutions run by the prison service in dealing with young offenders aged 10-17. The system covers the work of those agencies in preventing offending by children and young people and in particular in dealing with young offenders from the time he or she is apprehended to the time he or she is discharged from the system. In 1996 an Audit Commission value for money report described a system in which these services worked to different targets and none took responsibility for what happened to the young person. The reform was based on the single aim of preventing offending by young people. This is to be achieved through six objectives which are to:

- reduce delay in administering justice;
- confront young offenders with the consequences of their offending;
- helping young offenders to tackle problems associated with their offending;
- punishment proportionate to the seriousness and frequency of offending;
- reparation by young offenders for victims; and
- reinforcing parental responsibility.

1. In June 1997 the Home Secretary established a Taskforce on Youth Justice to advise on reform of the youth justice system. The members included people from the services dealing with young offenders including police officers, a headmaster, a lay magistrate, a stipendiary magistrate, magistrates’ clerk, a director of social services and a Chief Probation Officer as well as people working for victim support, business, the Home Office and the Lord Chancellor’s Department. The interim reports produced in August and October 1997 informed the youth justice reforms set out in the White Paper “No More Excuses” and the associated Crime and Disorder Bill.

*The Taskforce’s views helped build a consensus of those connected with youth justice services and consultation (not formal) succeeded in achieving early buy-in and commitment to change.*

2. Crime and Disorder Act passed in July 1998 introduced a statutory aim for the youth justice system – to prevent offending by children and young people. It provided for a Youth Justice Board to provide national leadership, to identify and promote good practice and provide advice to the Home Secretary. Local services were required to form multi-agency youth offending teams and to produce youth justice plans setting out how youth justice services were to be provided in their area. Chief Executives of local authorities with education and social services responsibilities were made responsible for ensuring there was a youth offending team for their area. The courts were given new powers to
make Parenting Orders, reparation orders and a new Detention and Training Order was introduced to be served half in secure facilities and half in the community.

3. The Taskforce drafted guidance on how to establish a youth offending team (YOT). Successive drafts were shared with larger groups of consultees and it developed to take account of the concerns raised by services that would have to implement it.

10 pilots were established and the results of pilots used to inform full-scale implementation a year later – letting other areas learn from the experience of the pilots.

4. The Youth Justice Board was set up in October 1998. It is required to monitor the operation of the youth justice system and the provision of youth justice services, to identify and promote good practice and to advise the Home Secretary how to achieve the aim of preventing offending by children and young people. The Board has powers to make grants and to commission secure accommodation for children and young people sentenced and remanded by the courts. The Home Secretary appointed members to the Board following Nolan procedures. The range of members is similar to that of the Task Force (three members including the Chair also served on the Task Force providing continuity).

5. The Board has recruited staff from probation, police, social services, youth offending teams and the private sector as well as the civil service. It has adopted a consultative style of work with regular rounds of regional conferences with people working with young offenders. Local services provide positive feedback on the consultations.

An inter-disciplinary body with representatives from all the main services concerned with youth offending.

6. Local authorities were required to prepare local Youth Justice plans in consultation with related services in their area and to submit these to the YJB in December 1999. The guidance on preparing the youth justice plans was informed by seminars with YOT managers and designed to be useful to them. A common range of data was included so the Board could collate them and provide comparative data back to local areas.

Youth Justice Plans prepared locally – with guidance.

7. The new Youth Offending Teams were put in place during 1999 and were in place in all parts of England and Wales by April 2000 when the statutory duty to have such teams took effect. They in turn established
new programmes to challenge offending behaviour, new bail supervision schemes and formed links with mainstream education and health services.

**Timed/planned implementation.**

8. The Youth Justice Board have helped to fund 440 different local programmes including e.g. Youth Inclusion, Parenting, Reparation, Mentoring, Offending Behaviour, Education and Training, Alcohol and Drugs.

**Resourcing issues addressed and funded**

Source: material from the Youth Justice Board
THE NHS BREAST SCREENING PROGRAMME: TOP DOWN – EXTENDING EXISTING POLICY

The NHS Breast Screening Programme currently invites women aged 50 to 64 for breast screening by mammography at a three yearly interval. Government funded research has shown that extending routine invitations to women aged 65 to 70 is feasible and cost-effective. The intention to extend the programme was announced in the NHS Plan in July 2000 and the NHS Cancer Plan in September 2000. Women aged over 70 will be entitled to screening every three years on request, as are women aged 65 and over now.

1. The programme has a high political, media and public profile. For example, Age Concern have lobbied for extending routine invitations to women up to 70, and have already begun lobbying to extend routine invitations to women over 70. A large number of women and their families are affected by the breast screening programme (1.2 million women are screened per annum).

2. Three pilot studies, launched by the previous government, were undertaken in between 1997 and 2000 to assess the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of extending routine invitations for screening to women aged 65 to 69. The pilots were run by an advisory group (DH cancer team plus R&D team to evaluate pilots) and the National Coordinating Team of the NHS Cancer Screening Programmes.

3. In May/June 2000, the results of the pilots were reported to the advisory committee on breast cancer screening – a NDPB comprising medical experts and specialists, and the National Screening Committee – the secretariat of which is provided by the NHS Executive. Both these bodies endorsed the results of the pilots and the recommendation that extension of screening should go ahead. However, they expressed concern about workforce problems.

   The policy was based on evidence from pilots which was endorsed by the profession. Combination of evidence-based and early buy-in from key stakeholders.

4. The NHS Plan trailed the new policy on extension which was announced in the NHS Cancer Plan. The target is to extend routine invitations for screening to women aged 65 to 70 by 2004. This will extend the number of women receiving breast cancer screening by 400,000 to 1.6 million. New screening techniques and a replacement IT system are also part of the programme.
The targets and timetable were clearly specified in a published document, including an indication of funding for the programme which is included in the funding for cancer in the NHS Plan.

The Cancer Plan also made clear the need to manage an expansion of key screening staff and it set out how this would be done.

5. The breast screening workforce is already under pressure due to screening more women than ever before. In addition, key screening staff – radiologists and radiographers – are in short supply. Expanding the programme will mean a 40% increase in the workload. This has been identified as the biggest threat to the failure to implement the extension programmed. Consequently, new skill mix arrangements, including a new grade of assistant practitioner, are being piloted from October 2000 at four development sites. National occupational standards are being developed to support the education and training required to deliver this. The pilots are due to be evaluated in September 2001.

There were initial concerns from the professional bodies (Royal College of Radiographers and Radiologists) about the possible effect of the four-tier structure on the high quality of the programme. Involving them in discussions at an early stage and in the pilots has helped overcome these initial concerns.

6. The extension will be phased in over 4 years with a 10% increase met in year 1 (2001), 40% in year 2 and 50% increase in year 3.

A managed and timely roll-out.

7. The extension to breast cancer screening is part of a high profile drive for improvement throughout the NHS.

As such it has benefited from being championed and supported as a supercharged priority, guaranteeing its profile and funding.

A management structure exists for the project which is part of a much bigger picture – 10 taskforces to implement the NHS Plan, of which one is for cancer.

Project management techniques are being applied across all major project areas, including the cancer projects, to support implementation.

8. The breast cancer screening extension requires co-ordination from the centre to the existing 87 breast screening units. This is done through the
National co-ordinator of NHS Cancer Screening Programmes and Regional screening Leads.

9. Each region will be required to assess their breast screening units and develop a detailed local plan and target date for completion. Ongoing monitoring of implementation will take place through the office of the National Co-ordinator.

Source: material from Department of Health
THE NEW DEAL FOR YOUNG PEOPLE : CENTRAL DESIGN – LOCAL DELIVERY

The New Deal for Young People (NDYP) is a key element in the New Deal Initiative and part of the wider Welfare to Work strategy. NDYP was introduced in 12 Pathfinder areas from January 1998 and became a national programme three months later. It is aimed at people aged 18-24 who have been claiming unemployment benefit continuously for six months. Participation is mandatory. Early entry is possible for some groups. The Employment Service has lead responsibility for delivering NDYP working in partnership with others: TECs, Local Enterprise Companies, local authorities, voluntary sector organisations and private companies. The delivery of NDYP through local Units of Delivery was designed to allow local knowledge of the labour market to inform delivery and meet more closely local needs.

1. Some key parts of the thinking on New Deal had occurred prior to the 1997 election and appeared as a commitment in the manifesto – to help move 250,000 long-term unemployed young people aged 18-24 from welfare into work. The model was devised centrally and was deliberately prescriptive involving a gateway period of 4 months maximum and four programme options and defined stages to give local flexibility.

A rigid and centrally-planned model contributed to simpler and more effective delivery. It also helped to drive implementation across a relatively short timescale. The model has been adapted to different local conditions by the Employment Service and the Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs).

The strength of the economy and the New Deal’s success resulted in a mismatch between the remaining client group and provision – employment increased and many people moved rapidly from the New Deal into work and the remaining unemployed had more entrenched problems and local provision has increasingly been reshaped to reflect that.

Resources were not a problem as funding was met from the proceeds of the ‘windfall’ levy.

2. The pathfinders were very quickly up and running in 12 areas in January 1998 and the programme was rolled out nationally 3 months later.

Running pathfinders concurrently with national roll-out worked well and lessons learnt in early implementation were fed into the national programme.
3. The Employment Service delivers the programme in 144 local delivery units according to one of four broad partnership models for delivery including forms of private sector lead in 10 areas.

_There has been variability in local performance. This partly reflects the impact of very different local labour markets and client groups. But, for example, the Joint Venture Partnerships partners were not always sufficiently robust in managing contract delivery._

_Some local Employment Service managers found their role confusing in both contracting and having strategic partnerships with the same partners._

4. Strategic Partnership Groups (SPGs) were set up for each Unit of Delivery. These were intended to have an advisory and monitoring role to reflect the varied labour market contexts and client profile of each area. Membership included core organisation such as TECs, career services LAs, employers etc.

_In practice the role of some SPGs has become more limited as the New Deal has matured. The membership of SPGs often overlapped with other local initiatives resulting in the Employment Service forming different relationships with key local players._

_At a local level other initiatives/policies can complicate and distort funding e.g. the Single Regeneration Budget and the European Social Fund._

5. The Gateway, a crucial element in helping people quickly into work and supporting the proposed four work-experience and learning options, provides a period of up to four months of personalised help.

_Delays were experienced in moving some young people out of the Gateway. The 1999 Budget announced further resources to intensify the Gateway process leading to more young people leaving the New Deal earlier._

6. The New Deal Personal Adviser was both novel and key to making the delivery ‘client-centred’. But this was a new role for front-line staff and required training. Initially it was unclear as to how staff would adapt to a new role in which they had more autonomy. The evidence now is that advisers have adjusted well to, and welcomed, more autonomy.

_The new role of personal adviser had to be defined carefully especially the nature of the change in the role of front-line staff and their associated new skills. Employment Service staff morale was given a boost by their_
new role. Vocational qualifications for all New Deal Personal Advisers were introduced.

Some good personal advisers were poached – with training in new skills they were able to progress elsewhere on higher salaries. The Employment Service is addressing this by developing internal progression routes for advisers including securing level 4 NVQs for senior advisers.

7. The New Deal Task Force provided a valuable source of real world feedback on the programme. It included employers, local government, voluntary sector and experts; carried out its own studies; and linked into local ‘employer coalitions’. This enabled it to provide a valuable support and challenge function.

Sources: material from the Employment Service and DfEE. John Philpott, After the windfall: the New Deal at work, Journal of the Institute of Economic Affairs, Vol 19, no.3 September 1999
STREET WORKS: LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORKS - MOVING TARGETS

The New Roads and Street Works Act 1991 was designed to minimise disruption caused by utilities digging up roads. There were powers in the Act for Highway Authorities to charge utilities for overstaying a reasonable period for their works. These are only now being activated. Although some aspects of the Act were successful, the unforeseen consequences of privatisation of utilities and the enormous rise in cable-laying in the mid-1990s led to pressure for firmer action. ‘Overstay charging’ will be introduced from April 2001 and an amendment in the report stage of the Transport Bill in the Lords opens the way for full ‘lane charging’ in future.

1. A committee in the mid-1980s drew up the provisions of what would become the New Roads and Street Works Act 1991. It was designed to address the disruption to traffic and pedestrians, primarily by utility companies, when installing and repairing pipes and cables. It came into effect in 1993. It contained a new duty on highway authorities to co-ordinate works, backed by new requirements for the utilities to give advance notice and a duty to co-operate with the highway authorities and each other. Both duties are on a best endeavours basis.

2. The emphasis was on co-ordination and co-operation, not financial disincentives. However, the Act did contain a provision to introduce financial penalties for some utilities street works. This allowed charging for works that occupy the road for longer than an agreed period.

The legislation dealt with the problems that were perceived at the time, in a way that appeared sensible at the time. Overall it improved on the situation under the previous legislation and all parties were keen to make it work.

The charging provision was not activated.

3. The charging provision was not activated partly because it was expected to be ineffective. The original Bill had contained a full ‘lane charging’ provision which had been watered down. The charge would be reckoned for overstaying a “reasonable” period. This was not only difficult to define and subject to challenge but the notification system itself was imprecise – utilities give a minimum period of notice before starting works without having to specify a fixed start time.

4. In the early 1990s, there was little pressure to close the loopholes on the notification and timing problem and so implement a system of charging. Effort was concentrated on bedding down the new regime. Added to this,
the information system was weak – there was patchy data on which to assess the impact.

5. However, two unforeseen factors increased the difficulties of operating within the original framework:
   - efficiency drives and the greater competitive environment following privatisation of utilities meant that cooperation, which had previously existed, was reduced. The utilities were less willing to compromise when the Highway Authority (with limited powers) suggested rescheduling work because of the impact on costs and the bottom line
   - the enormous rise in cable companies (particularly once they could use telephone cables for TV and more recently because of the growth in internet and e-commerce) massively increased the disruption caused by street works. They automatically obtain statutory rights to dig up roads once they have a cable license.

None of the main parties had an incentive to cooperate.

6. The main lobby group – RAC, supported by the Evening Standard – plus growing public protests led to a sponsored private members bill in the Lords.

The problems caused by streetworks are highly visible and affect a large proportion of the population.

Legitimate public concerns were recognised and action taken to consult on options

7. The Transport White Paper “A New Deal for Transport – Better for Everyone” stated that consultation would take place on “options for an incentive system, with penalties, to minimise disruption to all road users, and to encourage improved co-ordination of street works.” The subsequent consultation document included the full lane-rental option as well as the option of activating the overstaying regime.

The concern for Government as a whole is in balancing the costs of disruption to traffic and pedestrians against the competitive pressures, and benefits to consumers, in the fast moving communications sector. There are also cross-government actions to resolve e.g. DTI is responsible for handing out licences for cable services.

8. The Transport Bill proceeded through parliament in Spring 2000 on the basis of enacting the overstay provisions in the 1991 Act. However, following pressure during Committee stage in the Lords, the Government
introduced an amendment at the report stage that would give powers on full lane-rental, to be used if the overcharging provisions proved to be ineffective. (the “reserve” is in the policy not the powers)

**With perfect foresight, the 1991 Act might have constructed a different framework – possibly licences for utilities and other companies? – or at least the infrastructure (system and information management) to enable full lane-rental to be implemented.**

9. Charging for ‘overstaying’ will begin in April 2001. Highway Authorities will need to upgrade computer systems to manage the new regime. The regulations set out rates for different types of road but these can be waived or reduced by Highway Authorities. There will be local discretion to implement.

A potentially profound change – eroding the utilities’ right of free access to their apparatus – has been introduced 10 years after the power was originally made available.

Sources: material from DETR
Consultation Document *Reducing Disruption from Utilities’ Street Works*, DETR October 1999
Annex 2: Questions to ask any of any major delivery project

- **The vision**: is it clear; is there wide understanding and buy-in
- **The task**: is it clearly defined
- **The knowledge base**: do we know what works in practice
- **Viability**: are practitioners sufficiently involved in the policy design process; are there sufficient reality checks
- **Accountability**: is it clear who is in charge and responsible at each level
- **Performance**: are there clear measures of performance, transparent to all involved
- **Flexibility**: do managers have sufficient freedom to operate; are they clear about the limits
- **Support**: are those responsible for delivery being provided with adequate support and training
- **IT**: have IT issues been adequately addressed, taking into account the key lessons learnt about public sector IT
- **Learning**: are systems in place to ensure rapid learning about what is and isn’t working
- **Money**: are resources adequate, or adequately redirected from existing priorities
- **Alignment of interests**: what steps have been taken to align the key players, professions, institutions, frontline staff
- **Timescales and capacity**: is the system overloaded? Has there been an adequate assessment of its capacity to deliver?
- Are there on the ground **reality checks** during implementation? How is this being organised?
- **Joined-up Government**: has sufficient account been taken of policies in other departments which might have an impact, or vice versa?
Annex 3: Selected references

White Paper, Modernising Government, 1999

Professional Policy Making for the Twenty First Century, Report by the Strategic Policy Making Team, Cabinet Office, 1999


HM Treasury Spending Review 2000


J.Nye (ed.) Why Trust Government?

Annex 4: Seminar participants

**BETTER POLICY DELIVERY AND DESIGN SEMINAR**  
**23 January 2001**  
**Chair: Geoff Mulgan, Director PIU**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jeremy Heywood</td>
<td>Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister</td>
<td>10 Downing Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Miliband</td>
<td>Head, No.10 Policy Unit</td>
<td>10 Downing Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Andrew Foster</td>
<td>Controller</td>
<td>Audit Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wendy Thomson</td>
<td>Director of Inspection</td>
<td>Audit Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor Ron Amann</td>
<td>Director General CMPS</td>
<td>Cabinet Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suma Chakrabarti</td>
<td>Head of Economic and Domestic Secretariat</td>
<td>Cabinet Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Haskins</td>
<td>Regulatory Impact Taskforce</td>
<td>Cabinet Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mavis McDonald</td>
<td>Permanent Secretary</td>
<td>Cabinet Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jonathan Stephens</td>
<td>Head of Modernising Public Services Group</td>
<td>Cabinet Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moira Wallace</td>
<td>Director, Social Exclusion Unit</td>
<td>Cabinet Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Richard Wilson</td>
<td>Secretary of the Cabinet and Head of the Home Civil Service</td>
<td>Cabinet Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barry Cox</td>
<td>Deputy Chairman</td>
<td>Channel 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jon Bright</td>
<td>Head New Deal for Communities Unit</td>
<td>DETR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willy Rickett</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary, Transport</td>
<td>DETR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor Michael Barber</td>
<td>Head of Standards &amp; Effectiveness Unit</td>
<td>DfEE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Foster</td>
<td>Director, Welfare to Work Delivery</td>
<td>Employment Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthony Mayer</td>
<td>Chief Executive</td>
<td>Greater London Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Broadbent</td>
<td>Chairman of the Board</td>
<td>HM Customs &amp; Excise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Bowler</td>
<td>PS/Ed Balls (Chief Economic Adviser to the Chancellor of the Exchequer)</td>
<td>HMT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucy de Groot</td>
<td>Managing Director Public Services</td>
<td>HMT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Gieve</td>
<td>Director of Public Services</td>
<td>HMT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maeve Sherlock</td>
<td>Council of Economic Advisers</td>
<td>HMT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rt. Hon. Andrew Smith MP</td>
<td>Chief Secretary to the Treasury</td>
<td>HMT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Andrew Turnbull</td>
<td>Permanent Secretary to the Treasury</td>
<td>HMT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barry Quirk</td>
<td>Chief Executive</td>
<td>London Borough of Lewisham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mary Marsh</td>
<td>Chief Executive</td>
<td>NSPCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrea Lee</td>
<td>Economics Team</td>
<td>PIU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Varney</td>
<td></td>
<td>Public Sector Productivity Panel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keith Burgess</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>Skillsgroup plc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark Perfect</td>
<td>Chief Executive</td>
<td>Youth Justice Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Warner</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>Youth Justice Board</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>